



# FastPass

A harmonized, modular reference  
system for all European automated  
border crossing points

Presented by

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## Overview

- FastPass – motivation, facts, objectives and status
- Selected topics and results
  - User Needs and Requirements
  - Document inspection
  - Biometrics
  - Surveillance
  - Security and Privacy Assessment
- Summary and next steps

# Motivation

## Challenges :


Passenger flow

Requirements on  
the border control  
process

System risk  
assessment

Harmonization

Variety in usage




# FastPass – Project - Facts

## 27 partners:

- 3 border authorities
- 4 infrastructure operators
- 11 industry partners
- 5 applied research centers
- 4 universities

## Schedule

- 1.1.2013-31.12.2016
- Demonstrations/Pilots
  - Air (started in June)
  - Land (will start in 2016)
  - Sea (will start in 2016)



## FastPass Objectives

### Integration with EES and RTP

Entend usability to  
TCN

Evaluate the value  
of RTP for EU  
citizens

### Harmonized ABC Usability

Usage of passport  
scanners

Usage of kiosks

Instaneous  
„Go Through“

Usage of fingerprint  
scanners

### Supporting Innovative Border Crossing Concepts

Airborder:  
Comparison of  
classical method  
with kiosk biometric  
token

Landborder:  
Process  
with/without  
registration

Cruise ship:  
Enhance nominal  
list with biometric  
information

### Architecture Based on Innovative Technologies

Reference  
Architecture with  
open interfaces

Advanced  
Technology  
Modules (Passport,  
Identification, Video  
Surveillance)

Security evaluation

### European cooperation

Liason with  
commission, EP,  
Frontex, eu-LISA,  
FRA

Liason with other  
European  
Research Projects


Liason with  
industry

Liason with BG  
authorities



## Non-Users of ABCs

8% say, they are not entitled  
4% even don't know




3% prefer manual control

26% don't know how to use it

Matrix illustration of the taxonomy of non-use as described by Wyatt, Thomas and Terranova (2002).

Largest group (57%) are the 'Unawares'

# Factors affecting experience



# Most common challenges in use of ABC

## Passenger

- Lack of awareness:
  - ABC concept in general
  - Possibility to use ABC
  - What is necessary to use ABC
- Challenges in use:
  - When to enter/exit the gate
  - How and where to insert the passport
  - How to behave during the face capturing phase

## Border guard

- Amount and quality of information:
  - Correction of passenger errors
  - Number, position and quality of information sources
- Poor ergonomics and uncomfortable working conditions
- Limited possibility for profiling



## Results in

- |                                 |                                |
|---------------------------------|--------------------------------|
| • Inactivity/inefficient in use | • match, rejection and retries |
| • longer processing time        | • reduced satisfaction         |
| • increased number of no-       | • reduced productivity.        |



# Document scanning and its impact to ABCs



- **Analysis of passport aging effects**
- **New methods for improved feature checking**
- **Robust to presentation attacks**
  - Device mimicking a passport
- **Passport Simulator as testing tool**
  - Black-box testing of whole ABC gate
  - Automated simulation of large quantities of passports
  - Testing robustness against the active display
- **Robust to IEMI**
  - Vulnerability of electronic document readers against High Power Electromagnetics




## Variation in genuine passports



Most stable, variation  $\ll 3\%$










Still stable, variation around 3%



Not stable, variation up to 52%

# Aging effects



## Document reader interoperability test

### Document readers tested

1. 3M AT9000 MK2
2. ARH Combo Smart
3. ARH PRMc
4. Desko Icon
5. Desko Penta
6. Regula 7024m.111
7. Regula 7034.111
8. Suprema RealPass-V
9. Visotec Expert 600

### Parameters evaluated

- Optical resolution
- Basic radiometry
- Absolute color accuracy
- Special features such as glare suppression, OVD detection or micro-text inspection

### Documents tested

41 genuine documents  
11 countries  
4 types

### Results expected

Overview of features relevant to output image quality  
Performance comparison of these features  
Interoperability analysis of tested devices with the focus on verification of optical security features  
Recommendations w.r.t. to the ABC scenario


## Biometrics and ABC

Open Challenge	FastPass contributions until now	Reference
Biometric modality limitation <ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>- Passports have face and fingerprint</li> <li>- ABC installations rely on faces</li> <li>- Only RTP programs use additional modalities</li> </ul>	FastPass proposes <ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>- advanced features for next generation face recognition and</li> <li>- combination with additional modalities (finger, iris)</li> </ul>	Technology presentations from Modi at Passenger Terminal Expo and other trade fairs  Paper to be presented at BIOSIG 2015 Peter Wild, University of Reading, "Segmentation-level Fusion for Iris Recognition"
Face recognition is slow in some installations	FastPass analyses current face recognition to improve performance in ABC systems  FastPass proposes face verification "on the move" and iris from a distance	Paper presented at ISBC/AVSS 2015, Andreas Opitz, AIT, "Evaluation of Face Recognition Technologies for Identity Verification ...."  Technology presentations from Modi at PTE and other trade fairs
Spoofing is a relevant issue	FastPass proposes face recognition technology with improved 2D/3D spoofing detection  FastPass proposes algorithms for improved spoofing detection in multibiometrics	Technology presentations from Modi at PTE and other trade fairs  Paper presented in Pattern Recognition, Elsevier, Aug 2015; Peter Wild "Robust multimodal face and fingerprint fusion in the presence of spoofing attacks"
Token for segregated 2-step is process unclear	FastPass proposes biometric token (NIR face)	To be presented



## Face recognition on the move


### ■ Mirror-based face capture





### ■ Eye-safe capture in NIR spectrum



### ■ Liveness detection against face image/video, masks



### ■ Iris capture from a distance (option)



## Face recognition on the move

- Kiosk: Enrollment, border checks
- eGate: Fast 1:n identification using face as a token





02.09.2015

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# Multibiometric spoofing detection for Face & Fingerprint

(presented in: Pattern Recognition, Elsevier, Aug 2015. doi: 10.1016/j.patcog.2015.08.007)



- **Problem:** even a single spoofed finger can lead to a false accept, if spoof-detection fails.
- **Ambition:** Counter-spoofing at system-level
- **Contributions:**
  - Median filtering (MF) integrating matching and spoofing scores
  - „Outliers“ in scores detected
  - Bagging-based novel fingerprint counter-spoofing algorithm
- **Result:**
  - MF outperforms standard algorithms
  - Equal Error Rate remains stable



# Evaluation of Face Recognition Technologies for Identity Verification

(presented at 12th *IEEE Int'l Conf. on Advanced Video and Signal based Surveillance*)


- **Ambition:** Scenario-based (FastPass system at Vienna Int'l Airport) evaluation of biometric ROC performance verifying Frontex recommendation (FRR of 0.05 at a FAR of 0.001)
- **Results:**
  - 2 out of 3 commercial algorithms achieve these rates
  - Age of the passport has an influence on detection rates
  - Nationality of passport has an influence on detection rates





# Advanced video surveillance

- Person separation
- Queue analysis (length, dynamics) to get waiting time






# Risk Analysis – Threat Visualization

- STRIDE<sub>FastPass</sub> - risk classification based on STRIDE
- DREAD<sub>FastPass</sub> - risk scoring based on DREAD
- Risk analysis
  - IT centric
  - Used centric


	High (3)	Medium (2)	Low (1)
<b>Damage Potential (D)</b>	The person can subvert the security system and pass through the gate.	Long-term malfunction or failure of the gate; the person may overcome single security checks of the gate but not the complete process.	Short-term malfunction or failure of the gate; the person cannot pass through the gate.
<b>Exploitability (E)</b>	A novice person could make an unauthorised pass in a short time.	A skilled person could make an unauthorised pass, and then repeat the steps.	An unauthorised pass requires an extremely skilled person and in-depth knowledge to exploit.




- Development of a specific impact assessment for privacy
  - DPIA+ including ethical dimensions

# Risk analysis – Threat Visualization


## Damage Potential




## Exploitability




## Affected Components



## Threat Category




# FastPass – Air border scenario





## FastPass – Land border scenario

- Land border traffic increasing steadily
- New processes and infrastructures needed to handle the traffic
- Both EU citizen and TCN
- Definitive portion of regular travellers
- No land border ABC in EU exists
- Existing land border solutions use RTP type solutions
- Biometrics in outdoor conditions is an issue



## FastPass – Cruise ship scenario

- Carriers collect API from passenger travel
- Special provisions in the Schengen Borders Code for cruise ships
- Facial images are collected for ship management
- Cruise ship passengers are considered low-risk for *passport* control
- Cruise ship companies demand fast, flexible and convenient disembarkation/re-embarkation (mission critical)





## FastPass – the system, that

- **...is secure**
  - Resistent
    - to latest attacks on document scanner,
    - to biometric spoofing
  - Risk Assessment, Security Assessed by dedicated methodology
- **...you like**
  - UI developed with extensive feedback from different European border guards
  - Process and procedures developed with extensive evaluation from traveller groups
  - Respects privacy and data protection (Data protection impact assessment – DPIA)
- **...is harmonized – and shows new processes and scenarios**
  - ONE reference architecture serving many processes
  - First European solution for cars at land border with ABC
  - First solution for cruise ships
  - First solution for segregated two step process with face as biometric token
  - Real comparison of different approaches

# Thank You !

## Event information

**BIOSIG 2015**

**Thursday, September 10, 16:00 - 16:30**

Peter Wild, University of Reading,  
Segmentation-level Fusion for Iris Recognition



## Contact information

[www.fastpass-project.eu](http://www.fastpass-project.eu)

Email: [FastPassCoordinator@ait.ac.at](mailto:FastPassCoordinator@ait.ac.at)